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From Catching Up to Forging Ahead in Advanced Manufacturing—  
Reflections on China’s Future of Jobs1 
by  
Dieter Ernst 
 East-West Center, Honolulu 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores what we know about possible employment effects of the 10-year plan, issued 
by the State Council on May 19, 2015, entitled Made in China 2025. MIC2025 was designed to 
address China’s emerging labor shortage challenge. To achieve this goal, the plan seeks to boost 
labor productivity through an increased use of robots and through network-based upgrading of 
the entire industrial value chain and related services.  
 
How might the projected increase in labor productivity affect the creation and quality of jobs in 
China? Will China’s push into advanced manufacturing now move the country’s manufacturing 
employment closer to the pattern of “employment de-industrialization” observed in the US and 
other industrialized countries?  
 
How China will cope with the advanced manufacturing challenge for employment will have 
major implications not only for the US and other industrialized countries, but also for emerging 
economies and, most importantly for the majority of developing countries that are still struggling 
as latecomers to labor-intensive industrial manufacturing. The paper lays out objectives of the 
MIC 2025 plan and highlights a failure of Chinese policy makers to take into account 
employment effects and other labor market issues when they design their grand visions of 
industrial policy. 
 
The paper finds that until 2014, manufacturing has acted as an employment absorber in China.  
However new data on unemployment, labor force participation and income inequality signal that 
China may now be moving towards an “employment de-industrialization” pattern, unless enough 
knowledge-intensive service jobs will be created in China’s growing information economy. The 
paper concludes with implications for policy and further research. 
 
About the author 
Dieter Ernst, an East-West Center senior fellow, is an authority on global production networks 
and the internationalization of research and development in high-tech industries, with a focus on 
standards and intellectual property rights.  His research examines corporate innovation strategies 
and innovation policies in the United States and in China, India, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, and 
other emerging economies. The author has provided testimony to the US Congress, and has 
served as a member of the United States National Academies “Committee on Global Approaches 
to Advanced Computing”; senior advisor to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris; research director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy 
at the University of California at Berkeley; professor of international business at the Copenhagen 
Business School; and scientific advisor to governments, private companies, and international 
institutions. 
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China’s Advanced Manufacturing Challenge 
China has reached a level of development where catching up through an investment-driven 
“Global Factory” model is no longer sufficient to create long-term economic growth and 
prosperity. Serious constraints on environmental, human and financial resources imply that 
economic growth based on scale expansion is running out of steam. The closer China has moved 
to the technology frontier, the less scope there is for imitation and low-level incremental 
innovation. Of critical importance now is that Chinese firms develop and protect their own 
intellectual property rights and accelerate the commercialization of new ideas, discoveries, and 
science-based industrial inventions.  
 
Since the Third Plenum, China’s leadership has emphasized the need to upgrade the 
manufacturing industry beyond catching-up with global industry leaders to forging ahead in 
advanced manufacturing2. Emblematic of the shift to an innovation-driven development model 
are a series of policy initiatives that seek to accelerate major changes in China’s industrial 
strategy and its innovation system. 
 
This Think Piece focuses on possible employment effects of one such policy initiative, the 10-
year plan, issued by the State Council on May 19,2015, entitled "Made in China 2025 
MIC2025""中国制造2025"3. As MIC 2025 has not yet moved beyond the “vision stage”, it 
would be premature to search for definite answers or solutions. The purpose instead is to get a 
conversation started on a set of questions that this plan might raise for the future of jobs in 
China. As for the reader, some patience will be required to digest a few definitions of key 
concepts and some illustrative data points and case examples. 
 
In essence, MIC 2025 reflects the leaderships’ concern that China’s industry needs to upgrade 
beyond low-value added segments of the supply chain in order to compensate for the loss in 
labor cost advantages and a declining working population. Since the turn of the century, China 
has been experiencing a nationwide labor shortage and steep rises in worker wages, including for 
immigrant workers4. Development economists call this the “Lewis turning point” (named after 
nobel laureate economist W. Arthur Lewis - a term that is used to describe a point or rather a 
period during which “the rural wages begin to converge with the industrial sector. At that point, 
labour shortages appear and urban employers must offer higher wages to lure workers from the 
countryside. Corporate profits, export competitiveness and asset prices fall.”5 
 
MIC2025 was designed to address this emerging labor shortage challenge. To achieve this goal, 
MIC 2025 seeks to boost labor productivity through an increased use of robots and through 
network-based upgrading of the entire industrial value chain and related services. A 7.5% annual 
growth of labor productivity is projected until 2020, and from then on an annual 6.5% 
productivity growth. This would require a reversal of China’s long-term productivity slow-down 
from almost 9.5% during 2007-2012 to an estimated 6.7% for 20156. 
 
How might the projected increase in labor productivity affect the creation and quality of jobs in 
China? This country today is the largest global manufacturing site and the largest exporter of 
manufactured products. But will China’s push into advanced manufacturing now move the 
country’s manufacturing employment closer to the pattern of “employment de-industrialization” 
observed in the US and other industrialized countries? According to Lawrence and Edwards, US 
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manufacturing employment has grown more slowly than employment in the overall economy, 
due to a “combination of productivity growth, demand for goods, and international trade”7. Will 
China face a similar experience?  
 
It is necessary to add an important caveat. For analytical clarity, this paper focuses on a limited 
set of possible determinants of employment generation, i.e. the combined effect of technical 
change and a country’s industrial development strategy, as embodied for instance in the MIC 
2025 plan. In my view, a narrow focus on robot-based automation alone is insufficient to get to 
the root causes8. Potential employment effects of technical change are obviously shaped by 
broader determinants of a country’s production and innovation system, such as the stage of 
development, the growth model and regulations, and the available resources and capabilities. 
Potential employment effects might as well be constrained by misaligned incentives and poor 
governance, distorted allocation of resources and capital, as well as by impediments to the supply 
of skills and access to knowledge.  
 
There is a rich body of work that examines these parameters of China’s current industrial 
upgrading efforts9. This paper will not repeat those findings. It focuses instead on the following 
three questions: Is China, this role model of Latecomer Industrialization, now facing a slow-
down in manufacturing employment due to the combined forces of technical change (e.g. 
robotics, networked intelligent manufacturing or 3D printing) and an industrial strategy which 
seeks to combine domestic capability development with a deep integration into international 
trade and FDI through global networks of production and innovation?  Alternatively, might 
China now become trapped in a pattern of “premature deindustrialization” typical for developing 
countries, where manufacturing begins “to shrink (or is on course for shrinking) at levels of 
income that are a fraction of those at which the advanced economies started to deindustrialize”10? 
Or, thirdly, will China find ways to avoid those two destructive “Future of Jobs” scenarios, and 
what role (if any) might industrial policies like MIC 2025 play? 
 
As China now is the second largest player in the global economy, we all need to understand what 
really happens to China’s manufacturing employment. How China will cope with the advanced 
manufacturing challenge for employment will have major implications not only for the US and 
other industrialized countries, but also for emerging economies and, most importantly for the 
majority of developing countries that are still struggling as latecomers to labor-intensive 
industrial manufacturing. 
 
Part One of the paper lays out objectives and important features of the “Made in China 2025” 
plan. Part Two highlights possible implementation constraints, such as a bias for a rapid 
expansion of tangible infrastructure and equipment while capabilities in advanced manufacturing 
technologies remain weak. Arguably one of the most problematic weaknesses of MIC 2025 is a 
failure of Chinese policy makers to take into account employment effects and other labor market 
issues when they design their grand visions of industrial policy. 
 
Part Three asks what we know or don’t know about China’s manufacturing employment. Thus 
far China does not seem to have followed the “employment de-industrialization” observed in the 
US, nor do the available data indicate that China is likely to be caught in the trap of “premature 
deindustrialization”. But as MIC 2025 fails to provide robust employment projections, we know 
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very little about China’s future of jobs now that China’s growth is slowing and as the new push 
into advanced manufacturing gets off the ground. However new data on unemployment and labor 
force participation raises the question whether China may now be moving towards an 
“employment de-industrialization” pattern. Or have enough knowledge-intensive service jobs 
been created in China’s growing information economy which is the necessary foundation of 
forging ahead in advanced manufacturing?  
 
The paper concludes with implications for policy and further research.  
 
Part One - The “Made in China 2025” Plan 
MIC 2025, a ten-year plan to upgrade China’s industry through flexible automation and 
computer-based network integration, was drafted by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) over two and a half years, with input from 50 experts from the China 
Academy of Engineering and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, as well as around 100 experts 
from industry and research institutes. Issued by the State Council on May 19, 2015, MIC 2025 
has the full support of China’s leadership – Vice Premier MA Kai heads the Leading Small 
Group that is responsible for effective implementation.  
 
In contrast to earlier plans, like the Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology 
Development (MLP) of 2006, and the Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) plan of 201211, MIC 
2025 moves beyond science and technology and seeks to upgrade all stages of China’s industrial 
supply and demand chains.  
 
The plan is a direct response to Germany’s “Industrie 4.0” initiative that seeks to integrate 
factories, research labs, and service providers across domestic and global supply chains through 
flexible automation and the Internet of Things in industrial manufacturing12. The design of MIC 
2025 also draws on other international benchmarks that pursue similar advanced manufacturing 
upgrading strategies13.  
 
Germany has the advanced technology needed for MIC 2025, and thus is China’s preferred 
partner. For the German government and its leading corporations, demand from China offers 
unique sales opportunities.14. For Germany’s innovative SMEs however, protection of 
intellectual property rights and data security are major unresolved issues.15 It remains unclear 
what lasting benefits China might be able to capture. 
 
The challenge for China’s industry is that it is still in transition from Industry 2.0, which is 
mainly assembly lines, to Industry 3.0, which uses more industrial automation, electronics and 
IT.  Today, only about 60% of Chinese companies use industrial automation software, such as 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). And the internet adoption ratio of Chinese SMEs reaches 
only 25%16. To reduce this huge gap, MIC 2025 encompasses upgrading objectives for 
processes, R&D, human capital development, intellectual property rights, as well as technical 
standards. 
 
In essence, MIC 2025 addresses the following over-riding objectives: a big push in firm-level 
industrial innovation capacity (focused on R&D and patents); quality improvement and 
accelerated productivity growth and quality; an expansion of informatization and digitization of 
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industry; and “green development”, focusing on a reduction of energy consumption, water usage 
and pollution.17  
 
In order to implement these objectives, MIC 2025 seeks to provide a new framework for 
coordinating industrial support policies to overcome a persistent gap in technological, 
management and innovation capabilities across the whole gamut of China’s manufacturing 
industry. Improved policy coordination is considered to be particularly important in order to 
reduce the fragmentation of decision-making across government agencies and between the 
Central government and local governments. There is a broad consensus that improved 
coordination is essential for overcoming deeply entrenched disconnects between industry, 
academia and government. As an important step in this direction, MIIT has brought14 state-run 
associations from different sectors together and created a voluntary quality management standard 
for automated and intelligent manufacturing. 
 
MIC 2025 highlights 10 priority sectors for China’s push into advanced manufacturing: 1) New 
advanced information technology; 2) Automated machine tools & robotics; 3) Aerospace and 
aeronautical equipment; 4) Maritime equipment and high-tech shipping; 5) Modern rail transport 
equipment; 6) New-energy vehicles and equipment; 7) Power equipment; 8) Agricultural 
equipment; 9) New materials; and 10) Biopharma and advanced medical products.  
 
For each of these priority areas, MIC 2025 provides objectives, albeit still on a quite general 
level. For instance, for New advanced information technology, the plan sets out the following 
priorities: i) Catch up with world best practice in IC design cores and design tools; ii) move to 
the frontier of multicomponent semiconductors (MCOs); iii) win design-in contracts from China-
based electronic equipment manufacturers (both large global MNCs and Chinese firms like 
Lenovo or Huawei); and iv) strengthen China’s capacity to design and produce high-density chip 
packages and 3D micro-package technology. These specific priorities are practically identical 
with the objectives of China’s strategy to upgrade its semiconductor industry (as outlined in the 
in the Guidelines to Promote National Integrated Circuit Industry Development, June 24, 
201418). At least for this particular priority sector, this raises the question whether MIC 2025 si 
just repackaging under a different name already well publicized existing policy initiatives19. 
 
A fundamental assumption underlying MIC 2025 is  that forging ahead in advanced information 
technology is necessary for realizing in particular the following pet projects of China’s 
leadership: Develop production & innovation capabilities for large aircraft and aircraft engines; 
internal combustion turbines; intelligent green trains; e-cars; marine engineering equipment; 
high-tech ships; smart grid equipment; high-end NC machine tools; nuclear power equipment;  
high-end medical equipment. 
 
Part Two - Implementation Constraints - Barking at the Wrong Tree? 
Some observers argue that the strategy and the implementation policies of MIC2025 may fail to 
address China’s real industrial upgrading problems. As this plan closely follows Germany’s 
Industrie 4.0 initiative, there may be an insufficient understanding of how Germany’s situation 
differs from that faced by China’s industry. 
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Germany still has a very sound industrial base, especially in the SME sector, and there is little 
concern in Germany that Industrie 4.0 will lead to “employment de-industrialization”. In 
essence, Industrie 4.0 seeks to upgrade Germany’s current advantage in mechanical engineering 
and the chemicals industry through pervasive network-based upgrading of the entire value chain 
and related services. The idea is to leap ahead with mass customization of production - “for each 
consumer his own personally designed device”.  
 
By contrast, much of China’s industry is still stuck in very basic manufacturing – and many of 
these factories will not survive the next 10 years without major upgrading of facilities and 
production processes. The table below indicates that China’s industrial technological capacity 
continues to lag well behind comparator countries – it has the lowest percentage share of R&D in 
GDP, the highest energy consumption, and it faces substantially higher quality problems in its 
exports. Of particular concern are weak capabilities in high-end molds and dies, i.e. the press 
metal molds used in automotive outer body panels and for precision motor cores, and all-in-one 
printer cartridge molds. For those high-end molds and dies, China continues to depend on 
imports from Japan and Germany20 
 
 
 
 
All of this raises the question how useful MIC2025 can be as long as it is largely modeled on 
industrial upgrading strategies like Germany’s Industrie 4.0 or the US Advanced Manufacturing 
Partnership (AMP). But can these foreign strategies work under the quite different conditions of 
China’s industry? 
 
i) Robots are all the rage, but installation is growing from a low base  
Robots and in particular flexible and autonomous robots are supposed to play an important role 
in the MIC 2015 plan. Let us look at China’s official data on the use and local production of 
robots, and on the progress made towards autonomous robots21. From 2009 to 2014, sales of 
industrial robots in China increased by an annual average of 59%.  In 2014, sales volume 
reached about 57,000 units, which amounted to about one fourth of the total global robot sales.  
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For 2014, CRIA reports that 29 manufacturing sectors in China were using robots (up from 26 in 
2013). For 2015, the growth of robot sales is estimated at 25%, with the growth rate of the 
domestic robot suppliers’ sales estimated at over 40%. 
 
As the table 2 below shows, China has rapidly caught up with the global leaders in terms of the 
operational stock of multipurpose industrial robots. The media have widely reported on prestige 
projects, like the Swiss ABB robot project (the largest industrial robot R&D and production base 
in the southern part of China in Zhuhai High-tech Zone), and the all-robot manufacturing plant 
in Dongguan.22According to industry observers, many factories in the Pearl River Delta, the 
heart of China’s world factory, are investing in robots, as labor shortages bite and local 
authorities face the need to spur innovation to counter the economic slowdown.23 
 
 
 
However, China continues to lag behind in the use of industrial robots: While in Germany 282 
industrial robots are installed per 10,000 factory workers, that ratio is much lower for China: 14 
industrial robots per 10,000 factory workers24. On the supply side, China remains heavily 
dependent on foreign technology: 75% of all robots used in China are purchased from foreign 
firms (some with assembly lines in China), and China remains heavily dependent on imports of 
costly core components from Japan.  
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The latest count of local robot production reports 107 Chinese companies, but many of them 
produce  robots with low quality, safety and design standards. According to industry experts, less 
than 50 of those companies are likely to survive. And even these companies, including industry 
leaders like SIASUN Robot&Automation Co.Ltd25, are struggling with excess capacity and the 
lack of a vibrant local core components industry. More fundamentally, worker flexibility remains 
crucial for Chinese manufacturing industries, which constrains demand for robots26.  
 
ii) Weak innovation capacity for advanced manufacturing technologies 
Another important stumbling block for implementing MIC2025 may well be a persistent gap in 
China’s industrial innovation capacity for advanced manufacturing technologies. A recent 
Fraunhofer Institute study finds that Chinese researchers have patented important inventions in 
key advanced manufacturing technologies, including wireless sensor networks, embedded 
systems, low-cost robots and big data27. In terms of the number of patents filed for industry 4.0 
technologies, the Fraunhofer study finds that China is one of the largest players, especially for 
data networks and big data28.  
 
This indicates that China may have good chances to emerge as a future producer of some of 
those technologies. It is unclear however whether China has the capacity to develop 
commercially successful Industry 4.0 application platforms. The Fraunhofer study highlights 
“…the relatively low innovative quality of Chinese utility model applications and patent 
submissions when it comes to the application of industry 4.0 technologies. Numerous low-
novelty inventions have been registered, usually formulated in very imprecise terms.” For 
foreign companies, this certainly provides opportunities to penetrate the Chinese market by 
offering innovative advanced manufacturing solutions29.  
 
Despite considerable implementation constraints, MIC 2025 is likely to produce substantial 
improvements in manufacturing productivity. A report from the US Manufacturers Alliance for 
Productivity and Innovation(MAPI) concludes: “The infrastructure of doing business—
education, management, rule of law, and governance—would presumably improve, lowering 
operating costs and decreasing uncertainty. Western companies only stand to gain from any 
Chinese success.”30 In short, MIC 2025 appears to be “much better conceived and more 
appropriate for China's situation than the "indigenous innovation" approach and SEIs …[the 
Strategic Emerging Industries plan]. It will be more coordinated and utilize a wider array of 
policy tools. “31 
 
iii) But where are manufacturing employment data? 
Arguably one of the most problematic weaknesses of China’s MIC 2025 plan is a failure to take 
into account employment effects. Interviews with China-based scholars and industry experts 
conveyed one over-riding message - Chinese policy makers have largely neglected employment 
effects and other labor market issues when designing their grand visions of industrial policy32,33. 
This starts with very basic definitions. According to one observer, “to my own knowledge, there 
is no specific statistics on Chinese advanced manufacturing (AM) or on the employment effects 
of Chinese AM. Indeed, the Chinese government hasn't got a clear concept about AM (even 
though some policy-makers may think they have). Therefore, quite many companies reported 
their products as AM equipment, but the policy-makers haven't developed a clear criterion to 
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define AM. … if there is any report or statistics on this issue, my colleague and I do not think 
they are serious enough.”34 
 
Here is what a well-informed Chinese source had to say:  
 
“The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has not developed any 
formal statistics for AM yet, and no research has been conducted on the effect of 
MIC2025 on employment. In fact, what MII emphasizes right now is still the "machinery" 
technologies, such as the smart manufacturing, 3D print, robots, etc. 
 
As for the ten priority sectors highlighted in the MIC 2025 plan, proponents have not 
raised the issue of employment. In fact, this document was compiled by technical experts, 
mostly from the Chinese Academy of Engineering. The ten priority sectors reflect … the 
competition among different disciplines within the Chinese Academy of Engineering. 
Indeed, the ten priority sectors were not decided by any strategic policy-makers, but 
mainly by the community of researchers. …. it was just a game of competing for policy 
money. … those researchers care little about employment and skills…. In short, there is 
no formal policy discussion about skilled workers as part of the MIC 2025 plan.”35 
 
A frequent explanation for the lack of robust employment projections is that at the top leadership 
level, engineers continue to dominate who “mostly do not understand the economy. .. [They are] 
used to the idea that the rural area of China is such a huge pool for the resource of low cost 
labor - the labor can come or disappear automatically depended on whether you need it.”36  
 
Furthermore, the concept of MIC2025 “is relatively new for China and the ‘political talk’ was 
developed only in the first quarter of 2015.According to another well-placed source from within 
the government, administrative inefficiencies and inter-agency rivalries may also play a role in 
explaining the scarcity of serious data on expected employment effects of MIC 2025 and related 
plans: “I don’t think labor departments participated a lot in industry policy making in the past 
and present days. From the industry making department perspective, there is a lack of data and 
expertise on labor issues.”37 
 
In short, there is no doubt that the MIC 2015 plan will place China on the map of serious 
contenders for the application of advanced manufacturing. However, a massive technology 
acquisition drive on its own will not automatically foster China’s economic growth and 
prosperity. If overdone, Chinese factories would invest substantial amounts in factory 
automation, “but they may end up doing all of that just as inefficiently as their current 
manufacturing. Gross production may be huge, but it could be accompanied by a concurrent rise 
in Chinese corporate debt.”38  
 
Most problematic however is that Chinese policy makers have failed to base their design of the 
MIC 2025 on robust projections of possible employment effects and other labor market issues. 
After all, advanced manufacturing will produce sustainable economic and social benefits only, if 
this will produce a sufficiently large number of well-paid quality jobs, whether directly in 
manufacturing or in related industrial services. However, as we saw, the publicly available data 
provide no robust projections of future job creation in China.  
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Part Three – What Do We Know about China’s Manufacturing Employment Dynamics? 
Collecting data on China’s manufacturing employment and qualitative examples was quite an 
adventure - the author had to conduct a considerable amount of detective work, given the 
imponderability of China’s data on manufacturing employment, wages and quality of jobs. The 
only official statistics on employment is on the website of China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS)39, but the data are organized in such a way that it is quite tedious to construct proxy 
indicators for manufacturing employment. Interviews with China-based industry experts and 
researchers have helped me to navigate through this maze of fuzzy and sometimes conflicting 
information. 
 
i) Manufacturing as an employment absorber 
Before we get into the data, it is important to place the search for China’s manufacturing 
employment data in a broader perspective. Debates in the US about the future of manufacturing 
employment in essence conclude that the decline in manufacturing employment results from the 
combined forces of technical change (through automation and robots) and globalization (through 
trade and FDI in global networks). According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 
share of jobs available in US manufacturing has been declining steadily since the mid-1950s. But 
after 2000, this share declined steeply, especially during the recessions of 2001-02 and 2008-
2010. 40  
 
China however raises a puzzle: While China today is the largest global manufacturing site, 
manufacturing employment in China thus far does not follow the pattern observed for the US. 
The available manufacturing employment data show no sign that China has followed the 
“employment deindustrialization” observed in the US. Nor are there signs of a “premature 
deindustrialization.” 
 
As Nick Lardy, a China expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, observes: 
“Manufacturing employment did dip by 18 million or almost a fifth between 1995 and 2000, a 
period when the then Premier Zhu Rongji pushed through a far-reaching reform that resulted in 
the closure of thousands of inefficient state-owned firms.41 But as the effect of this reform waned, 
manufacturing employment rose steadily, not only in absolute numbers but also as a share of 
total employment.”42 43 
 
Research conducted by Judith Banister for the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that 
“China’s manufacturing employment showed a continual increase over the 2002-2009 time 
period, rising from 85.9 million in 2002 to 99.0 million in 2009. As Chinese employment grew 
by about 15 percent over the 7-year period, manufacturing employment in other countries 
covered by BLS was stable or declined. China’s 2009 manufacturing employment was much 
greater than manufacturing employment in any other country: for example, manufacturing 
employment in the United States in 2009 was about 14.2 million, was 10.8 million in Japan, and 
was about 7.8 million in Germany.”44 
 
From 2003 to 2014 China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reports that total urban 
manufacturing employment has doubled and the share of the urban workforce employed in 
manufacturing rose from 15 to 20 percent. In addition, “there are a significant number of 
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manufacturing workers in rural areas, not reflected in the data in the table. Workers in private 
firms and self-employed engaged in manufacturing in rural areas rose from 14.5 million in 2003 
to 23.6 million in 2014.” 45 
 
The table below confirms that manufacturing in China still acts as an employment absorber. 
While the percentage share of manufacturing in GDP declined from 32.5% in 2003 to 29.9% in 
2013, the share of persons employed in manufacturing increased from 27.9% in 2005 to a record-
breaking 29% in 2015. Manufacturing industry continues its dominant position. In 2013, only 
Korea has a higher percentage share of manufacturing in GDP than China.  In terms of 
employment effects, China has by far the largest percentage share of persons employed in 
manufacturing46. 
 
 
Until now, rapid externally generated growth in manufacturing seems to explain why labor 
productivity growth in China’s manufacturing industry has been accompanied by employment 
growth. This would confirm Evsey D. Domar’s observation that income-generating productivity 
growth is necessary for employment growth47. 
 
To explain why employment growth in China thus far went hand in hand with productivity 
growth, it is worth quoting in some detail the analysis of Nick Lardy48:  
 
““The rapid rise in both domestic and foreign demand for Chinese manufactures 
swamped significant productivity gains, leading to a sizable increase in the share of 
workers employed in Chinese manufacturing over the last 10 to 15 years. … China is 
growing at a pace several times that of the United States and it is at a much lower level 
of per capita income than the United States … .As a result, Chinese household 
consumption patterns, while beginning to change, are much more concentrated on goods 
rather than services, leading to strong growth of manufacturing output. China’s growth 
over the past decade and a half has been driven largely by a high and rising share of 
investment in GDP, further compounding the demand for inputs produced in the 
manufacturing sector. Finally, the liberalization of the economy associated with China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 led to a huge surge in China’s 
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share of global exports and particularly its share of global manufacturing exports, which 
tripled from 6 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2012. In contrast, over the same period 
the US share fell by half, from 18 to 9 percent. As a result …, the pace of real growth of 
manufacturing output in China …[between 2000 and 2012] …was about eight times 
faster than in the United States.”  
 
ii) How will the shift to Advanced Manufacturing affect manufacturing employment? 
But what is happening now as China’s growth is slowing and as the MIC 2025 plan seeks to 
forge ahead in advanced manufacturing? How might the disruptive shift to slower growth, 
combined with a massive move to advanced manufacturing reshuffle China’s cards for job 
creation? In short, will the positive manufacturing employment effect be reversed? 
 
Any attempt to answer these questions is constrained by the lack of robust projections of the 
future of manufacturing jobs in China that was highlighted in Part Two of this paper.  
 
The China Center for Information Industry Development (CCID) provides a few publicly 
available proxy indicators of employment trends in China’s ICT industry. In this industry, the 
number of employees increased during China’s 11th Five-year Plan period (2006-2010), from 
22.44 million to 32.94 million, with an annual growth rate of 10.1%. For China’s chip design 
industry, CCID reports that the total number of employees increased by almost 15% in 2014 
relative to 2013 to ca 147,000. As the average sales per employee increased by 13% in 2014 to 
$116,000, this arguably provides a very rough proxy for the sector’s productivity growth49.  
 
The China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2014  reports a decline of manufacturing employment 
from 543.4 million in 1994 to 298.1 million in 2002, but shows a quite significant increase from 
298.0 million in 2003 to 525.8 million in 2013. And the China Statistics Yearbook of High 
Technology Industry 2013 reports that employment in both high-tech industries and 
manufacturing industry in general has increased from 2000 to 2012.Apart from these data 
crumbs, it was not possible to find useful manufacturing employment data in the public domain.  
 
iii) New data on unemployment – Is China now moving towards “employment 
deindustrialization”? 
An examination of unemployment data might in principle provide useful insights into the 
employment dynamics of China’s manufacturing industry. 
 
In China, the unemployment rate measures the number of people actively looking for a job as a 
percentage of the labor force, a measure that differs from those used in most OECD countries. 
China’s official unemployment rate, as reported by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, has remained practically constant since 2003 slightly below the 4.1 % mark – a quite 
surrealistic “achievement” for an economy that has grown at lightning speed with drastic 
changes in its composition50. Collecting data on the real amount of manufacturing 
unemployment however is considered to be quite sensitive, almost as sensitive as research on 
labor conflicts. 
 
A recent NBER working paper calculates, for the first time, China’s unemployment rate from 
1988 to 2009 using a more reliable, nationally representative household survey in China51. The 
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paper documents to what degree the official statistics underestimate China’s real unemployment 
rate (see Figure below). The unemployment rates calculated by the NBER study differ 
dramatically from those supplied in official data and are much more consistent with what is 
known about China’s labor market and how it has changed over time in response to structural 
changes and other significant events. The NBER unemployment rate averaged 3.9% in 1988-
1995, when the labor market was highly regulated and dominated by state-owned enterprises, but 
rose sharply during the period of mass layoff from 1995- 2002, reaching an average of 10.9% in 
the period from 2002 to 2009. The study estimates that the actual unemployment rate in 2002-09 
averaged nearly 11 percent, while the official rate averaged less than half that. Moreover, despite 
some reports to the contrary, by 2009 China's labor market had still not recovered from huge 
layoffs that occurred during the later 1990s and early 2000s as the nation transitioned from a 
government-controlled economy to one in which private enterprise and market forces were more 
at play52. 
 
Of particular interest for our purposes are the significantly different unemployment rates for 
different demographic groups, different regions, and different cohorts. The study finds that 
“people without college degrees, younger people, and females systematically face more slack 
labor markets than their more educated, older, and male counterparts…The most striking pattern 
is that younger people had very high unemployment rates, especially for more recent cohorts... 
Even at the age of around 30, the 1970s female cohorts had roughly a 10 percent unemployment 
rate, as compared to only 3 percent for females born in the 1960s." 
 
 
 
The NBER paper also documents significant regional disparities in unemployment rates, as some 
regions fared worse than others. The Northeast, South Central, and Southwest regions of the 
country saw the largest increases in their unemployment rates during the 1995-2002 period. 
These were also the regions with the greatest number of layoffs by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). In the Northeast region, for example, some 7.3 million workers were laid off during the 
period – 42 percent of its total SOE employment in 1995. 
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The NBER study finds that labor force participation rates (which are not available in official 
statistics) have declined throughout the whole period, particularly from 1995 to 2002 when the 
unemployment rate increased most significantly. While China's unemployment rate has soared 
since the mid-1990s, labor force participation has dropped. Participation averaged 83.1 percent 
around 1995, fell dramatically during the transition, and stabilized at around 74 percent during 
the 2002-09 period. Young people were hit especially hard by the layoffs during the 1995-2002 
period. The labor force participation rate of young men and women, with and without college 
education, all fell by more than 10 percentage points. 
 
The quite significant diversity in employment outcomes, reported in the NBER study, might well 
reflect the increasing inequality of income that China has been experiencing since the turn of the 
century. A recent study for the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) finds a rapid increase in 
income inequality in China’s recent past, drawing on newly available survey data collected by 
several Chinese university survey organizations  (see figure below)53.  
 
According to the NAS study, China’s income inequality not only surpasses that of the United 
States by a large margin but also ranks among the highest in the world, especially in comparison 
with countries with comparable or higher standards of living. The study argues that China’s 
current high income inequality is significantly driven by structural factors attributable to the 
Chinese political system, the main structural determinants being the rural-urban divide and the 
regional variation in economic well-being. 
 
 
 
Of particular concern for China’s “Future of Jobs” is the high unemployment rate among 
university graduates which apparently has been rising over the last years. The Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) reports a graduate unemployment rate of 12% in 2010, while foreign 
observers estimate the graduate unemployment may be as high as 27%.54 A recent study, jointly 
conducted by the Texas A&M University and China’s Southwestern University of Finance and 
Economics found that 16.4% of university graduates between the ages of 21 and 25 were 
unemployed, whereas only 4.2% of those in the same age bracket who have dropped out before 
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middle school were unemployed.55 Despite high graduate unemployment however, US firms in 
China report a lack of availability of talent as a top-ranking operating challenge56. 
 
Implications for Policy and Further Research 
This Think Piece has explored possible employment effects of China’s push into advanced 
manufacturing, focusing on the 10-year plan, issued by the State Council on May 19,2015, 
entitled "Made in China 2025 MIC2025""中国制造2025". According to offical data, 
industrial manufacturing has played an important role as an employment absorber until around 
2014.  
 
However, we know very little about China’s future of jobs now that China’s growth is slowing 
and as the new push into advanced manufacturing gathers momentum. Furthermore, new data on 
unemployment, labor force participation, and income inequality raise the question whether China 
may now be moving towards an “employment de-industrialization” pattern. Alternatively, are 
enough knowledge-intensive service jobs being created in China’s growing information 
economy, which after all is the necessary foundation for efforts to forge ahead in advanced 
manufacturing?  
 
In short, we’d need to know whether knowledge-intensive manufacturing services might create a 
sufficient amount of quality spillover employment effects to support China’s push into advanced 
manufacturing? And what kind of policies might be conducive for such indirect spillover 
employment effects? 
 
Because of data limitations, the answer to those questions is left for further investigation in the 
future. The following observations and questions might help to lay out such a research agenda. 
 
Insights from research on manufacturing services 
Research in the US and other industrialized countries leaves little doubt that robots and other 
advanced manufacturing technologies are bound to reduce the DIRECT labor requirements of 
China’s manufacturing industry.57 For the US, Pisano and Shih find:“ Manufacturing now 
accounts for only about one in ten American jobs. With increasing productivity,…it is hard to 
imagine how manufacturing could ever return to the days when it employed about a quarter of 
the US workforce.”58 
 
For the US, Susan Helper, the former chief economist of the Department of Commerce, argues 
that, for a firm to sustain productivity gains, it is necessary that it pays higher wages to its 
workers than competing firms59. These higher wages in turn have the potential to create a 
virtuous circle: better paid workers are more motivated to create productivity-enhancing product 
and process innovations; in turn, these productivity gains support higher wages. It is interesting 
to note that Bart van Ark, senior economist at the US Conference Board (a US-based Think tank 
for global business), supports the argument that higher wages may create income-generating 
productivity gains.60 
 
Recent research by the US Academy of Engineering has identified the proliferation of 
manufacturing services as an important source for quality jobs61. By integrating manufacturing, 
services and R&D, successful firms can use advanced manufacturing technologies to provide 
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packaged solutions that combine high productivity gains with substantial job gains in 
complementary support services. 
 
The graph below illustrates the great variety of knowledge-intensive support services required 
for a fairly traditional type of PC manufacturing. 
 
 
And a 2011 study by the UK-based Work Foundation finds that 70% of UK manufacturing firms 
are offering the following manufacturing services that create quality jobs: Design & product 
development (22%); Systems & solutions (19%); Maintenance & support (12%); Retail & 
distribution (12%); and Installation & implementation (5%)62. 
 
Another important source of quality service jobs necessary for advanced manufacturing can be 
found in a variety of digital infrastructure platforms63, such as broadband as an enabler of new 
applications (e.g., cloud computing); 4G wireless communications; integrated health information 
systems; smart electric grids; low carbon energy information systems; intelligent transportation 
systems; mobile payments systems; and mobile Collaborative Learning Systems64. 
 
Implications for policy-oriented research in China 
In order to assess whether China will be able to generate a sufficient amount of quality jobs, we 
need data on the growth of employment in knowledge-intensive services that are required to 
implement advanced manufacturing technologies. MIIT, through its "China Info 100" 
committee, provides the following data points on the development of China’s innovation 
economy. Unfortunately, there is no definition provided of how China’s information economy is 
measured65.  
 
Nevertheless as an indication of the self-perception of parts of the Chinese government, it is 
useful to quote these data. In 2014, China’s information economy is reported to have reached 
Yuan 16.76 trillion (ca $ 2.73 trillion), ranking as number two after the US66. While in 2008, the 
size of China’s information economy expanded by almost 11%, it grew by more than 14% in 
2014. In 2014, the percentage share of China’s information economy in GDP for the first time 
exceeded 25%, and it is reported to have contributed more than 58% to China’s GDP growth. 
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Assuming that these data indicate roughly the order of magnitude of growth in China’s IT-related 
services, what then do we know about the growth of jobs in those services? Data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) for instance show that the number of employees in 
telecommunications and other information services has increased by more than 74% over eight 
years from 812,511 in 2003 to 1,416,417 in 2011 (the latest year for which data are available), 
with employment growth accelerating since 2008.  And for the number of workers in computer 
services and software, NBS reports a 76% growth within three years from 1,858,000 in 2010 to 
3,273,100 workers in 201367. 
 
Until we will have more precise data, it is worthwhile considering the following observations 
from interviews that were conducted for this paper with China experts. There is a broad 
consensus that the emphasis placed by MIC2025 on the use of robots and network-based 
upgrading of the 10 priority sectors is going to boost demand for workers with highly specialized 
skills, especially in the afore-mentioned knowledge-intensive services related to mobile 
communications, software and chip design. But no data seem to be available in the public 
domain on the size of projected specialized skill requirements. This lack of reliable data 
constitutes an important handicap for China’s push into Advanced Manufacturing. 
 
Quite a few interviewees emphasize that the scarcity of specialized skills needed for the big push 
in advanced manufacturing is an important factor in explaining the rise in graduate 
unemployment described before. Interviewees also report that growing demand for IT-related 
specialized skills is driving up wages for those skilled workers. This demand boost for highly 
specialized skills seems to crowd out smaller domestic firms, and leave the field to a few large 
companies, whether foreign MNCs or large Chinese corporations like Huawei.  
 
For example, one interviewee reports that the entry level pay for IC design engineers are higher 
today in Shanghai or Shenzhen than in Taipei. It is somewhat perplexing that despite such higher 
pay levels, leading Chinese IC design houses which are based in Shenzhen or Shanghai (like 
HiSilicon or Spreadtrum) are competing successfully with Taiwanese counterparts. One 
plausible explanation may be access to subsidies68. Another explanation may be the use of 
foreign (Taiwanese, US, Korean) engineers who are moonlighting in China (sometimes over the 
weekends). These foreign chip designers are used to work under best-practice R&D management 
processes, and thus may well be more productive.  
 
Specific questions for further research 
1. How important is the Internet Plus (IP), a plan initiated by the State Council, China’s 
cabinet? According to some interviewees, the IP Plan is supposed to complement MIC 2025. It 
strives to meld on a large scale the modern internet (cloud, mobile, and big data) with 
manufacturing and electronic retail trade. Few details are available, although an action plan is 
supposed to be forthcoming. The plan will likely focus on upgrading traditional industries with 
modern technology, and will search for new technologies to spur economic growth, and 
spreading internet applications. Research is needed to identify precise objectives and 
implementation policies. 
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2. It might help to connect China’s evolving domestic consumption patterns with China’s 
“Future of Jobs” puzzle. As the Chinese economic model moves from exports to domestic 
consumption, Chinese consumers might demand more advanced goods and services. How might 
this affect employment in advanced manufacturing? 
 
For example, the rise of Chinese consumers in the information communications and technology 
market has enabled Chinese technology firms (such as Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, and Oppo, as well 
as chip design companies like Spreadtrum) to compete at the lower-end domestic market and 
then move up in value as the domestic market demands more sophisticated goods. Because of 
China’s rising middle class and their new consumption power, domestic firms are poised to have 
more opportunities to create what Clayton Christensen is calling “market-creating” innovations 
(innovations that expand the labor market).69 So perhaps China can avoid negative spillover 
effects because domestic consumption of advanced goods can sufficiently offset the job losses of 
using less labor intensive manufacturing methods? 
 
3. In addition, we’d need research that would examine data for instance on the following 
questions:  
 
i) Might the growth of advanced manufacturing (AM) employment in traditional activities that 
create products which face growing demand be able to compensate for the displacement of 
traditional manufacturing jobs?   
 
This question actually relates to an old debate among economists about the conditions under 
which the introduction of labor-displacing technology might create more jobs than are displaced. 
Take David Ricardo who, in the 1817 edition of The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, argued that over the long run, growing demand should compensate for  temporary job 
losses. But in a revised edition in 1822, he reversed his original position, arguing that 
mechanization would prove “often very injurious” to workers70. Or take John Maynard Keynes 
who, more than 100 years later observed: “We are being afflicted with a new disease, namely 
technological unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of 
economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour.”71 
 
ii) We need in-depth research on the growth of employment in software and other services to 
support the growth of advanced manufacturing and the resultant requirements for skill 
upgrading. 
 
iii) We’d also need research on the growth of employment in the production of advanced 
manufacturing equipment (such as autonomous robots, computing and communication 
equipment for Big Data centers, etc) as an upstream activity to the use of advanced 
manufacturing  technologies . 
 
iv) Furthermore, important insights on the potentially huge indirect employment effects of 
advanced manufacturing could be gained from the study of China’s massive investments in 
digital infrastructure platforms, in particular China’s Smart Grid project72. 
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v) Finally, we’d need research on new manufacturing activities that are enabled by advanced 
manufacturing technologies that did not exist before (by industry or level in the value chain). Is it 
correct to assume that some of these new manufacturing activities (like the growth of generic 
drug manufacturing or solar panel manufacturing) may not displace jobs in traditional 
manufacturing activities? 
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